近日，我院陈雨新讲师独著论文“State Formation and Bureaucratization: Evidence from Pre-Imperial China”在经济史领域顶级期刊The Journal of Economic History在线发表。

内容摘要：

This paper studies the relationship between military conflicts and state-building in pre-imperial China. I develop an incomplete contract model to examine rulers’ and local administrators’ incentives in conflict. Defensive wars drive decentralization: landowning local administrators have more to gain from a successful defense and are therefore more committed to it. Offensive wars drive centralization: the landowning ruler has personnel control over the non-land-owning local administrator and can therefore force the latter to participate in less lucrative attacks. Model predictions are corroborated with empirical evidence and historical case studies, and offer broader implications for the political divergence between China and Europe.

作者简介：

陈雨新，威廉希尔足球网讲师，斯坦福大学经济学博士，研究方向为经济史、历史政治经济学、制度经济学，论文发表于American Journal of Political Science、Journal of Economic History、Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization等期刊。